adjustment, to provide an equally successful causal explanation of another law of phenomena, one of a kind different from that contemplated in the formation of the theory. This "unforeseen and uncontemplated" agreement in which "rules springing from remote and unconnected quarters should thus leap to the same point,"2 was for Whewell the hallmark of certitude; his central "evaluative criterion"-as John Losee puts it (1983, p. 113)3 -for the truth of scientific theory.
Yet Whewell never explained how or why consilience should lend a theory such a "stamp of truth" (1847, 2: p. 66). In fact he never put it forward as a derivative of his philosophy of science at all (and indeed it is not). Consilience was presented by him as a feature of (undisputedly) true theories, which is disclosed by the history of science: 2Whewell (1847, 2: p. 65). This interpretation of Whewellian consilience is considerably narrower than-though by no means contrary to-interpretations of some Whewell commentators. In Butts (1968, p. 18) consilience is described merely as the requirement that "a good hypothesis explains more than that which it was first introduced to explain." In his 1977, pp. 74-75, although more detailed, the description of consilience still glosses over the crucial point of the two laws finally explained, being of quite different kinds at the point when the theory is suggested. As if to illustrate my point the word "different" is omitted from his citing of Whewell's aphorism XIV on page 74 (the same mistake is made in Laudan [1971, p. 369] ). In fact, according to Butts's analysis consilience can only be talked of when the difference is apparent, since the domains of evidence of the two laws have to be found eventually to overlap. (His account of consilience will be dealt with in more detail below.) Larry Laudan, in his 1971, p. 37 1f., suggests that what Whewell called consilience was either one of three cases; the first is: "When a hypothesis is capable of explaining two (or more) known classes of facts (or laws)"; the second roughly coincides with the account suggested here; the third is: "When an hypothesis can successfully predict or explain the occurrence of phenomena which, on the basis of our background knowledge, we would not have expected to occur." Mary B. Hesse, in her 1974, p. 206, follows Laudan verbatim. Neither Laudan nor Hesse provide references to Whewell's work to support the claim that he had regarded their first and third cases as consilient. I would contest that the first case is anything other than (good-see n. 4 below) straightforward Whewellian induction characteristic of many of Whewell's own examples of false and non-consilient hypotheses (Ptolemy's epicycles, the horror vacui theory, etc.). As to their third case, interesting as it is, it is not mere surprise that lends a theory consilient support, it is the surprise upon finding different classes of phenomena accounted for by the same theory (i.e., their second case). Thus, only if the unforeseen phenomena predicted by the theory are of a different kind than those contemplated in its forming would we have consilience in Whewell's sense and that would be a variation on their second case.
However, since it is not the aim of this paper to decide what Whewell took to be consilience, but rather to decide whether or not what I take to be Whewell's idea of consilience holds any water; and since what I take to be Whewell's idea of consilience is not argued by Whewell's critics (what would be argued is that it is his only idea of consilience), I wish not to take this exegetical question any further here. 3Losee (1983, pt 113). Losee, however, goes on to talk of consilience rather loosely, describing it as "a conceptual integration in which less inclusive generalizations are incorporated into a more inclusive theory" (p. 114), which is again not more than what Whewell would call an ordinary induction. not contemplated in its formation) than in a non-consilient theory (one that was initially designed to explain both laws). It is to the examination of this intuition that this essay addresses itself.
We shall wish to examine two interrelated questions:
(1) Does the fact that a theory undergoes a consilient process, as outlined above, in itself lend it support (i.e., would the theory have been less supported had it been applied to both laws in a non-consilient process), and if so why? That is, does our intuition mirror some (yet unarticulated) merit of our theory, or does it merely reflect the pleasant surprise upon having luckily guessed right? (2) Does the elucidation of consilient support require reference to pragmatic considerations such as time dependence, intended scopes, etc. ?
Yet before turning to the elucidation and evaluation of consilience, it is important to point out that the description of it differs considerably from what latter-day writers talk about when they use the same term. (This is a question quite different from the exegetical problem of deciding what Whewell meant by "the consilience of inductions" referred to briefly in note 2 above.) A short exposition of the problems taken up in the name of consilience in recent literature will serve two purposes: First, to emphasize that consilience, in what I take to be the original Whewellian sense, has not been adequately explored thus the reason for the present paper; and secondly, to highlight the fact that our proposed elucidation of it can be made to bear upon some of the other problems mistakenly discussed in its name. The problem dealt with by William Kneale (1952, p. 106f.) under the heading, "The Consilience of Primary Inductions," is that of explaining the apparent rise in the probabilities of "primary inductions," L1, L2, L3, . by virtue of their explanation by the same "transcendent" (i.e., explanatory) theory. Roughly speaking, the setting is that in which Whewellian consilience can occur namely, lower-level generalizations "colligated" and explained by a higher level theory. However, Whewell was concerned with-to use Kneale's non-Whewellian terms-the rise in probability of the theory, not of the laws explained by it, and only in the special case in which the theory was (surprisingly) found to apply to another law, of a different kind, uncontemplated when the theory was devised. Whether or not these peculiar circumstances lend the theory extraordinary support, Kneale 
II
To restate our first question more pointedly, we ask whether it is possible to find any nonsubjective difference between: (a) the nonconsilient case in which a theory is successfully conjectured to jointly explain two correlational generalizations each over a different class of phenomena; and (b) the consilient case in which the theory is successfully conjectured as an explanation of one such generalization, and it then surprisingly turns out to apply equally successfully to the other.
Should our account of the merit of a theory turn on the increase gained in predictive and explanatory power alone, consilience in itself would clearly offer it no support since the increase in predictive and explanatory power is in both cases the same. The final state of knowledge in both (a) and (b) consists of the same theory applied to the same two generalizations. Therefore the difference between them, if at all, would have to lie in their case histories; that is, in the two different processes by which the theory arrived at its final state. Let us scrutinize this somewhat closer, and for the sake of clarity cast it in semi-formal garb.
Let the two classes of phenomena be the Pl's and the P2's, and the correlational generalizations they are known to exhibit be respectively:
7This calls for some explanation. I do not contest the fact that if a theory T entails evidence E, then within Hesse's confirmation theory the increase in confirmation of T is correctly explicated in terms of the initial improbability of E. (It is easy to show within a Bayesian confirmation theory that P(T/E) o 1/PO(E) whenever T implies E.) I do oppose
Bayesian confirmation theories in general, but that is not the point here. Consilience, as I hope to show in detail below, is a situation in which at a certain stage T is made to entail E, either by reformulating T or by reinterpreting one of the lower-level laws it is applied to. Bayesian confirmation theories accommodate for changes in the probability of T in the light of new evidence E only under the assumption that the relation between T and E remains unchanged throughout (in which case the smaller PO(E) the greater P(T/E)). Since this is not the case in consilient situations, and since in any case no improbable evidence is involved-for the lower-level laws are well confirmed prior to the suggestion of T-I do not believe that Hesse In the first and non-consilient case-in which T is conjectured as an explanation of both L1 and L2-it is assumed that the P1's and the P2's are C's.9 What is conjectured and subsequently put to the test is that C's do indeed possess properties H which are the cause both of the A-ness of the P1's and of the B-ness of the P2's.10 (However, since T was construed from the very start as a causal explanation of L1 and L2, we will not be testing whether or not H causes A and B as much as whether or not C's do in fact possess properties H.) T acquires support by the fact 9In fact in many cases C will simply denote the joint class of P1's and P2's, and even if C denoted a wider kind to which the P's were assumed to belong, it would still be possible to state T as a conditional in which P1 P2 is the antecedent, and all additional features of C are accounted for in H. However, I prefer, even at the risk of seeming superfluous, to refer to the antecedent of T by means of separate notation because, as we shall see, it does not always retain the same referential meaning throughout the process.
It is also interesting to note that P1 and P2 may even coincide referentially as in the following imaginary example. Let Pi and P2 both designate planets, and L1 and L2 Kepler's first two laws respectively. Let T be the theory that relates to each planet an inverse square force exerted on it by the sun which is proportional to its mass. Now, imagine it to be believed (as Kepler himself did) that the equal-areas-in-equal-times law derives from the stability, symmetry, and periodicity associated with their status as heavenly bodies, and that T is conjectured solely as an explanation of their elliptic path. Thus P2 would designate planets qua heavenly bodies, and P1 planets qua masses attracted by the sun.
'?Although in what follows we shall talk loosely of A and B deriving from H, it will be assumed throughout that T is structured in a meaningful and nontrivial way. (Thus, where T is to be construed as According to Laplace's hypothesis, the entire solar system originated in an "atmospheric" cloud rotating around the sun which in the course of contracting formed the planets by condensations in the plane of the solar equator. In a similar process the satellites were formed around the planets The P's, A and B, etc., would be the planets and satellites and the various features of their revolutions and rotations, the C's would be all the bodies of the solar system, and H would consist of all the features of such bodies represented as condensations of the conjectured spinning and contracting cloud. H is contrued so as to yield the various features of the solar system that the hypothesis was initially designed to explain.
In the second and consilient case the process is somewhat different. T is initially conjectured and offered as an explanation of L1 only; that is, Pl's are assumed to be C's. T is then confirmed (as an explanation of L1) by testing H to yield A in varied circumstances and for a variety of PI's. When T is then forwarded as an explanation of L2 too, what will be tested (when in a variety of circumstances and for a variety of P2's, H is shown to yield B) is not so much T itself, but the claim that P2's are also C's. (A claim which as we remember is assumed in the nonconsilient case.) However, one must differentiate further between two types of situation. T could be found to apply surprisingly to L2 either because T is reinterpreted so as to account for L2 (in L2's original meaning) or because L2 is reinterpreted and rendered explainable by T (according to T's original meaning). (In reality we would usually encounter a little of both but for the sake of clarity we shall proceed to analyze each case separately.) In the first case, P2 retains its original meaning (which is quite different from P1) and C is "stretched" and reinterpreted so as to include P2's (as for example when the theory of gravitation was conjectured to apply to all massy bodies not only to the sun and the planets, thus explaining, alongside Kepler's laws, also the law of free fall, the regularities of the tides, etc., without them changing their original meanings). L1 and L2 remain different laws of two distinct types of phenomena and are rendered similar only in the light of T."1 In the second case, C retains its original meaning and P2 is reinterpreted so as to be included in C. (See, for example, the reinterpretation of Kepler's second law in the imaginary example in note 9 above. Such a move is also typical of explanations by reduction.) Here L2 is reconsidered, reinterpreted, and found similar to L1 irrespective of T (although probably inspired by T's success as an explanation of L1) thus paving the way for its explanation by T. In the second case, former categorical (or rather ontological) classification is reshuffled, in the first case it is not. 12 Let us now compare both of the consilient cases with the non-consilient case.
At this stage no apparent difference can be pointed out between the non-consilient case and the first of the consilient cases. The difference seems to be entirely temporal. In the non-consilient case, C was construed from the start to accommodate both Pi's and P2's, whilst in the consilient case C was made to accommodate P2's only after it was tested over L1. However, there seems to be no difference between the two cases in neither the initial nor the final state of our knowledge: L1 and L2 retain their original meanings and in both cases are successfully explained by T.
In the second consilient case, in which L2 (or at least P2) undergoes a change of meaning, although the final state of knowledge is the same as in the non-consilient case (i.e., T explaining both L1 and L2), knowledge of the nature of L2 is acquired during the process which in the non-consilient case was known all along. Thus one may conclude that whereas in both the consilient cases and in the non-consilient case the final states of knowledge are the same, in the second of the consilient cases more is learnt since we knew less about P2's to start with. This particular case of consilience inevitably involves an increase in knowledge due to a "reshuffle" of ontological classifications, forever absent in non-consilient inductions. This was pointed out with great clarity in Butts (1977) .
"1When Whewell demands of consilient cases that "the hypothesis of itself and without adjustment for the purpose, gives us the rule and the reason of a class of facts not contemplated in its construction" (1847, 2: pp. 67-68) he is not referring to adjustments of scope, but to adjustments of what is conjectured of the scope-that is, of H. It is important that C is "stretched" (to include P2's) in a manner that does not change the nature of T's explanation of L,.
12Butts in his 1977 deals only with this second type of consilience. His treatment of it is extremely good, and both his conclusions, (a) that this type of consilience is marked "by indispensable semantic or conceptual changes" (p. 79), and (b) that this type of consilience adds "nothing new or important to the confirmation or corroboration of these hypotheses" (pp. 73-74), coincide with our own conclusions below.
In this paper I shall not enlarge upon an analysis of the conceptual change undergone by L2 in the second type of consilient case. I am quite satisfied with the account of it in Butts (1977) . The point here is not so much the nature of the conceptual change in the second case as that there are two distinct types of consilience. In what follows I shall wish to argue that it is in the first rather than in the second type of consilient process that a theory gains extraordinary support. 
III
But our intuition, the soundness of which this paper set out to explore, was that in undergoing a consilient process a theory acquires greater support than it would have had had it undergone a similar non-consilient one. In order to assess such a claim in relatively undisputed fashion, we would have to compare both processes in reference to an agreed theory of inductive support. Needless to say no such undisputed theory exists. Thus there is no way one could proceed from here in a manner acceptable to all. Previous writers on consilience (with perhaps the exception of Butts) have always taken for granted that it represented a sound intuition, and proceeded to test the merits of confirmation theories against their ability to give a reasonable account of it. We wish to do exactly the opposite; that is, to test the merit of Whewell's intuition against an accepted theory of inductive support. Since in the past I have expressed my preferences towards one such theory-on grounds other than the elucidation of consilience13-I shall proceed to examine our claim in relation to it. It is L. Jonathan Cohen's method of relevant variables.14 Nonetheless, in order to avoid unnecessary dispute, reference will be made only to Cohen's notion of scientific test, and to the consequent grading of support, for they offer, as I hope will be apparent from the short account that follows, a sound and intuitive elucidation of the type of controlled experiments utilized in testing lower-level scientific generalizations and the way in which their results are graded.
I shall first briefly outline Cohen's theory of testing and support-grading of lower-level generalizations (such as L1 and L2). This will lead us to an assessment of the manner in which a theory (such as T) is assigned support by virtue of its successful explanation of lower-level generalizations. Finally, the non-consilient and two consilient processes outlined above will be compared and evaluated in the light of Cohen's theory. But first to experimental test.
To test a correlational generalization such as L1 is to investigate whether or not there is some P1 to be found that is not A. Testing is not carried out arbitrarily but in deliberately contrived circumstances in which to the best of scientific knowledge, non A-ish P1's are most likely to be found. Cast in Cohen's terms, our claim that in a consilient process T gains a higher degree of support than it would have in a non-consilient process amounts to showing that T undergoes a more thorough test in a consilient process than in the non-consilient process; that is, a test in which a greater number of relevant variables are manipulated.
In order to minimize obviously irrelevant pragmatic considerations, we shall assume that the consilient and non-consilient cases reflect a real difference in prior ontological commitment. Namely, that in the nonconsilient case L1 and L2 are viewed from the start as laws of similar kind-reflected by the fact that an explanatory theory was indeed sought for them jointly-whereas in the consilient case they are viewed as laws of a completely different kind. We thus eliminate cases in which laws not really different were not contemplated because of mere oversight or carelessness. Now, to say, as in the non-consilient case, that L1 and L2 are regarded as similar enough to be considered explainable by one and the same theory, is to say that we suspect that whatever causes P1's to exhibit or sustain their A-ness (or bars the possibility of them exhibiting non-A-ness) is what causes P2's to exhibit or sustain their B-ness (or bars the possibility of them exhibiting non-B-ness). This, I think, is closely related to Cohen's basic notion of material similarity of hypotheses. The fact that it is in relation to the falsification of materially similar hypotheses that the experimenter selects the circumstances in which he thinks his own hypothesis is most likely to be falsified, reflects, I think, a belief in a similarity of cause. To test "All ravens are black" in circumstances in which otherwise white swans were found to lose their color, reflects a deeper (though usually unarticulated) scientific hunch that whatever causes or sustains the whiteness of swans also causes or sustains the raven's plummage hue. (Cohen himself does not discuss his classes of material similarity, what they reflect, and the ways in which they are apt to change. Some reflections on these topics may be found in my paper cited in note 11 above.) Thus it is reasonable to conclude that if LI and L2 had been elected as candidates for one and the same explanatory theory-as in the non-consilient case-one may assume that they belong to, if not the same set of materially similar hypotheses, then to sets closely akin. Similarly, if they are not contemplated for joint explanation-as in the two consilient cases-one may reasonably conclude that they initially belonged to quite different sets. Let us examine the test procedures of T in the nonconsilient and the two consilient cases. Thus it is tested even more thoroughly than before and is therefore assigned a higher degree of support. Why these new circumstantial variables are to be regarded as relevant to the law derives simply from the fact that the suggested theory associates it with other laws that do not belong to its original set of materially similar hypotheses. The effect of conjecturing an explanatory theory is many times that of recasting the laws explained by it in terms of their material similarity. Cohen says this but not in so many words. He demands that laws should be instantiated in the new circumstances suggested by the theory, but does not discuss the issue in terms of the feedback effect an explanatory theory has on the original classification of the lower-level generalizations in sets of material similarity.
IV
This recaptures yet another Whewellian insight, namely, that each act of induction involves a new conception being superinduced upon old facts by which they are seen in a different light. The "different light" is here expressed in terms of a reconsideration of material similarity manifest in the supplementary relevant variables, and consequently-if the test is passed-further inductive support made inaccessible in the absence of the new conception, or rather, theory.
In the two consilient cases, L2 and L2 are assumed to belong to sub- The greater the difference, the wider the spread of variables over which T is tested; if successfully, the greater the support. However, inasmuch as the difference of L1 and L2 reflect difference of orientation in terms of Cohen's material similarity, and inasmuch as Cohen's material similarities reflect causal hunches, dissimilar generalizations will not usually be contemplated together when causes for them are sought; and the eventual application of T to L2 will usually indeed come as an unforeseen and surprising move.
In the second type of consilient case (the only one recognized by Butts), P2 changes its original meaning to something far more akin to P1. This I take to represent a shift in L29s orientation in terms of material similarity, and thus also a replacement of V' by a different set of relevant variables, say, V", implied by the new orientation, which is as in the nonconsilient case close if not identical to V. Consequently, in this case, as in the non-consilient case, the gain in support for T is modest. But unlike the non-consilient case this brand of consilience is always accompanied by that increase in knowledge the "reshuffle" of our prior ontological commitment-expressed by the replacement of V' by V".
V
To summarize, a consilience of inductions-a process in which a theory T, acting successfully as an explanation of a lower-level generalization, LI, is surprisingly found to explain equally well another quite different generalization, L2-can occur in two possible ways. In the first, the two generalizations retain their original (and different) meanings; the result is that support of T from empirical testing is considerably higher than it would have been had the two generalizations been more alike. The second type of consilient process is not really consilient at all, for in the process of applying and testing T one of the generalizations is reinterpreted and rendered less different from the other than was previously thought. Apart from this gain of knowledge-characteristic of all pseudoconsilient cases-it ranks with the non-consilient. The successful explanation of two quite different correlational generalizations by one and the same theory could result either in a conceptual (and ontological) shift in which L2 is rendered more like LI (as in the imaginary example in note 9, had the inverse square law been found to apply equally well as an explanation of Kepler's second law; as a result P2 would have changed its meaning from planets qua heavenly bodies to planets qua masses attracted by the sun). In this case the resulting support for the theory would not be much larger than it was before its application to L2 because of the great overlap between V' and V".
On the other hand when it results in a reinterpretation of the theoretical terms in T with L1 and L2 retaining their original meanings (as when Newton's inverse square law was made to apply to both planets and sublunary massy bodies), upon application to L2, T (and with it LI and L2) acquires extraordinary support since V and V' hardly overlap at all, and both LI and L2 are tested more rigorously. In actual cases we should expect a bit of both effects; both some reinterpretation of L2 and some theoretical adjustment of the scope of C. Hence one would expect as a result both some ontological "reshuffling" and some consilient support. The interesting thing is that in terms of support both effects are reciprocal; i.e., the larger the ontological shift (the larger the overlap of the V's) the smaller the consilient support, and vice versa.
Thus arises the interesting difference between this account of consilience and the one in Butts (1977) . According to Butts, for laws to gain support by virtue of their explanation by one and the same theory (and consequently, for the theory to gain support by explaining two apparently different laws), one must show that the domains of evidence (i.e., the classes of confirming evidence) of the two overlap. For according to Bayesian confirmation theory, to gain support of L by evidence E is for the probability of L to rise (in relation to its initial probability) by virtue of E. It follows that for evidence E1 that confirms L1 to support a different law L2, E1 itself must raise the probability of L2. It seems quite impossible on this account to explain how, for example, evidence of tide regularities can confirm laws of planetary motion (by virtue of gravitational theory) and vice versa. For two generalizations to lend each other support their evidence classes must to some extent overlap. The greater the overlap the greater the support. It follows that on Butts's account consilience is best achieved when it is apparent; that is, when the two laws thought quite different (with no overlap of evidence classes) at one time, are found not so different (with great overlap of evidence classes) at a later time. Hence consilience in the genuine sense-where the difference between the laws is sustained throughout-cannot occur. In Cohen's superior confirmation theory, rise in support is due to the outcome of severer tests, hence (one of) the effect(s) of explaining two laws by one theory is not that of rendering (some of the) evidence for each law relevant to the other, but of rendering each of the laws' test controls relevant to the other; from which follows that in the light of the theory, and as a test of it, the laws are retested in a more severe manner. The crucial point being that the smaller the overlap of relevant variables, that is, the more different the laws, the greater the severity of the test, therefore the greater the support. Although the primary concern of this paper was to articulate and evaluate consilience, and not to evaluate confirmation theories, the fact that genuine consilience eludes the type of Bayesian confirmation theory advocated by Butts 
